In following pure thinking's long journey in the "realm of shadows" of the Logic I have shown that the work of memory has not disappeared with the conclusion of the Phenomenology . Transformed into the funcy y tion of dialectical or logical memory, Erinnerung is instead essential to the g beginning, the advancement, and the conclusion of the logical process in its entirety. I have argued that such memory is the " figure" that the dialectic-speculative method assumes throughout the Logic once at stake is no longer the development of consciousness but the immanent determination process of pure thinking, and once such determination is considered at the intersection of the two contrary movements of "interiorization" or "going to the ground" and "exteriorization" or in the advancement toward new contents. This twofold movement, conclusively formalized in the absolute method, brings the Logic to its end and warrants its position as the first, foundational discipline in the system of philosophy. As the logical movement goes back to the immediacy of being, thereby recollecting the logical beginning in the end, it also moves on to the new immediacy of nature, to the beginning of the Realphilosophie . From now on the Logic, as the first systematic discipline, constitutes the methodological basis upon which to develop the philosophy of nature and, in particular, the philosophy of spirit. What interests me in this chapter is to further explore the continuity that the concept of logical memory institutes between the Logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit -between logical and concretely spiritual thinking and recollecting. At stake now is no longer pure thinking but psychological thinking. And the question, accordingly, is: What is the memory that accompanies and, indeed, articulates the process of Psychological Memory, Personal History, and Subjectivity 83 psychological thinking? I have argued in the previous chapter that a common problematic basis underlies the development of logical and psychological thinking. This can be summed up in the notion of "objective thinking" whereby Hegel expresses both the issue of the conceptual comprehension and articulation of being and the issue of the actual realization of conceptual thinking.
1 I have maintained that both in the Logic and in the Psychology such a problematic basis is commonly articulated by the function of dialectical memory. Accordingly, in this chapter, I will continue my argument, turning to the Psychology of the philosophy of subjective spirit. The first task here is to show the way in which the movement of liberation of theoretical spirit is accomplished on the basis of the structures of dialectical memory developed in the Logic, and to reflect on the significance that this has for Hegel's concept of spirit. The second task, however, is to raise the question of what distinguishes logical from psychological memory -the memory that respectively articulates the logical structures of Being, Essence, and the Concept, and the memory that brings to light the subjective reality of Geist. On this basis -that is, on the basis of the logical foundation of the philosophy of spirit and of the distinction between logical and psychological memory -I will then conclusively turn to the connection between memory and history in the philosophy of spirit. In particular, I argue that while history is already present at the level of spirit's subjectivity as personal or private history, this will become meaningful only at the level of objective spirit. Herein, however, history as world history is no longer based on the principle of memory but, as we will see, on the principle of justice.
The different memories of the psychology
In Hegel's mature philosophy, which is developed on the basis of the Logic as the first systematic discipline and now recognizes the 1807 Phenomenology only as its introduction, y 2 the topic of recollection and memory -Erinnerung and g Gedächtnis -belongs thematically to the philosophy of subjective spirit and, more precisely, to the sphere of Psychology. The Psychology follows a development that takes place through Anthropology and Phenomenology and prepares the transition to objective spirit. It is at the level of the Psychology that the notion of Geist is presented for the first time in its most proper meaning: neither t (anthropological) soul nor (phenomenological) consciousness or selfconsciousness, but spirit in the most proper sense of the termt Geist as t the "truth of the soul and of consciousness."
3 If only for this reason, the
